








My research, which comprises work in moral and political philos-
ophy, moral psychology, and philosophy of religion, begins with 
the following familiar picture of one important role that morality 
plays in human life: conforming to moral ideals enables you to live 
in a valuable form of community with other, equally reasonable 
people, even though these people’s interests and goals may be con-
siderably different from yours. In other words, there are a stagger-
ing number of people on the planet, and their various interests 
come into sharp and frequent conflict. On the one hand, it is ap-
propriate for each person to devote some special attention to her 
own private interests, and to the interests of people who are close 
to her; but on the other hand, there is a sense in which each of us 
is just one person among others, and no one is any more or less 
significant than anyone else. Both of these judgments are central 
to the living of our lives, and conforming to moral ideals is appeal-
ing and important, in part, because it enables us to live in a way 
that gives expression to each of them: a morally virtuous person 
sometimes pursues her private interests, but does so in a way that, 
to some degree, draws her out of her solitude, and into valuable 
forms of community with others.  
Discussions, and expressions, of this view in the literature tend to 
focus on respects in which, in order to enter into relevant forms of 
community, we must limit our outward behavior in ways that leave 
room for other people to pursue their various reasonable goals. By 
contrast, my work focuses on respects in which, to enter into these 
forms of community, we have to trust people, have faith in them, 
and adopt other, related attitudes toward them. In other words, 
my work focuses on respects in which our entering into these 
forms of community depends not only on our outward behavior, 
but also on features of our inner, psychological lives; and this em-
phasis on the inner life helps us better understand the role that 
morality occupies in our lives, and better appreciate the appeal 
and importance of conforming to moral ideals.  
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My current research is organized into two distinct, but related, 
strands, each of which appeals in some way to claims about the 
respects in which our adopting certain attitudes toward one an-
other draws us into valuable forms of community. The first strand 
appeals to such claims in order to provide novel answers to some 
widely discussed questions about the nature and value of rights, 
and the second appeals to such claims in order to address topics 
that have been largely neglected in recent moral philosophy – top-
ics concerning the moral significance of faith and grief. I will now 
describe each strand in more detail, and then briefly describe an 
additional project and my plans for future research.    
1.   
It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can per-
missibly treat people, even in the service of good ends: we may not 
steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to 
famine relief; break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we 
encounter someone else along the way whose need is somewhat 
more urgent; or harvest organs from one person without consent, 
in order to save others who need transplants. In other words, peo-
ple have moral rights not to be treated in certain ways. The view 
that people have such rights is central not only to discussions 
within moral and political philosophy, but also to many people’s 
conception of the distinctive value of human life. The first strand 
of my research concerns the nature and value of these rights.  
Despite the intuitive appeal of the view that we have rights, many 
philosophers have found rights deeply puzzling: Our reason to ob-
serve people’s right not to be mistreated in some way does not 
seem to derive, in any obvious way, from the importance, for po-
tential victims, of avoiding that form of mistreatment. After all, if 
we observe, say, people’s right not to be tortured, then we will not 
torture someone, even when this is the only way to prevent even 
more people from being tortured. It seems that, on balance, we 
could better serve potential victims’ interests by doing whatever 
would minimize the number of people who are tortured. Nor does 
our reason to observe people’s rights seem to derive from reasons 
to protect our own interests, or the interests of people we care 
about. To the contrary, people’s rights prohibit us from mistreat-
ing them whether or not our observing the prohibition would serve 
our own interests, and no matter what we care about. But if our 
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reason to observe people’s rights does not derive from the im-
portance of protecting potential victims’ interests, our own inter-
ests, or the interests of people we care about, then it is unclear 
what its source could be. How could there be prohibitions against 
mistreating people that both prohibit us from doing what would 
best serve others’ interests and bind us without regard to our par-
ticular aims?      
There are many accounts in the literature that attempt to make 
rights intelligible. But none of these accounts commands anything 
like universal assent, and even the most promising among them 
are, at best, substantially incomplete. In “Civic Trust”, I develop 
a novel account of rights that fills important gaps left by views in 
the literature. This account helps make rights intelligible by identi-
fying a morally significant relation that we bear to people when, 
and only when, we observe their rights not to be mistreated in cer-
tain ways: put roughly, observing people’s rights is a condition for 
being worthy of a certain form of trust, and being worthy of such 
trust is an essential part of living with others in the sort of harmo-
ny that characterizes morally permissible interaction. By focusing, 
in ways that other accounts do not, on the role that observing one 
another’s rights plays in our psychological lives, this approach not 
only makes the structure of rights more intelligible, but also helps 
us better appreciate the force of our reason to observe one anoth-
er’s rights, and better understand the kind of moral community to 
which we should aspire.  
In “A Better World”, I clarify and defend the form of argument 
that underlies a very different approach to making rights intelligi-
ble, an approach that is distinct from, but compatible with, the ap-
proach that I adopt in “Civic Trust”. Thomas Nagel, Frances 
Kamm, and Warren Quinn each argue that if we have rights, say, 
to freedom of religious expression and protection against police 
torture, then we have a certain desirable moral status; but if we do 
not have rights, then we have some other, less valuable status in-
stead. So, they conclude, we would all be better off if we had rights, 
and this somehow gives us reason to believe that we do, in fact, 
have them. This account of rights is an instance of the following 
form of argument: if the truth of some moral theory – quite apart 
from the results of our believing the theory or acting in accord 
with it – would make for a better world, this fact somehow pro-
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vides evidence of the theory’s truth. This may seem to be an obvi-
ous non-starter; after all, the mere fact that the truth of some em-
pirical claim – for example, the claim that there is an afterlife – 
would be desirable does not, by itself, give us any reason to believe 
that it is true. But I argue that this form of argument, when it is 
properly understood, is valid in moral philosophy, and that recog-
nizing its validity helpfully broadens our understanding of how to 
justify moral principles. I also identify some of the argument’s 
most promising applications.  
2.  
Like the first strand of my research, the second strand rests on 
claims about ways in which attitudes that we adopt toward one 
another draw us into valuable forms of community. But this sec-
ond strand, which is marked by its engagement with psychological 
research and literary work, addresses largely neglected topics con-
cerning the significance of faith and the significance of grief. Turn-
ing first to faith, non-religious moral philosophy has devoted little 
attention to the nature and value of faith. This may seem unsur-
prising. Because the significance of faith is typically associated 
with theism, it may seem that a careful study of faith has little to 
offer non-religious moral philosophy. Furthermore, in the absence 
of religious beliefs that might lead someone to value certain kinds 
of faith, philosophers might be, not just indifferent to faith, but 
hostile to it. Philosophers prize rationality, and so, may dismiss 
faith as a form of naïvete, or as some other objectionable form of 
irrationality.  
But it would be a serious mistake for moral philosophers of any 
sort to dismiss faith altogether. I argue in this strand of my re-
search that, whether or not theism holds, certain forms of faith in 
people – as distinguished from faith in God or faith in a set of reli-
gious tenets – are centrally important virtues; that is, they are 
character traits that are morally admirable, or admirable from 
some broader perspective of human flourishing. For example, im-
agine a civil rights activist who works to secure just treatment for 
an oppressed racial minority. The activist’s faith in the very politi-
cal leaders and citizens who accept, or even support, oppressive 
institutions may prompt her to pursue a campaign of non-violent 
resistance, which seeks not only to eliminate injustice, but also to 
convert one’s oppressors and enter into community with them. Or 
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consider a loving parent whose headstrong son has been credibly 
accused of some terrible crime, though the evidence against him is 
not clearly decisive. This parent’s faith may prompt her to cling, 
for a while, to her belief that her son is innocent, even if informed, 
disinterested observers are likely to conclude that he is guilty. Or 
imagine a first-generation college student – a child of Mexican 
immigrants – who discovers, upon entering college, that many of 
her classmates and teachers have rather dim views of Hispanic 
students’ drive and intellectual ability. Such a student’s faith in her 
own competence and in the quality of her own character may 
counteract her doubts about her ability to succeed in these chal-
lenging circumstances. I argue that a careful study of the nature of 
these forms of faith, and the roles that they play in human life, 
promises to deepen our understanding of aspects of moral life, and 
aspects of human flourishing, that are poorly grasped.  
I discuss these issues in three interrelated papers: In “Faith in 
Humanity”, I argue that having a certain limited form of faith in 
other people’s moral decency, namely, the sort of faith that the po-
litical activist in the example above has in her fellow citizens, is an 
important moral virtue. I defend this view in two ways. First, in 
order to make the view intuitively more plausible, I discuss two 
moral exemplars – one historical and the other literary – whose 
lives vividly exhibit such faith. Then I present an underlying ra-
tionale for the view: put roughly, having this sort of faith in peo-
ple’s decency tends to prompt them to act rightly, helps us avoid 
treating them unjustly, and – crucially – draws us into a morally 
important form of solidarity with them. In “Three Varieties of 
Faith”, I continue to develop my characterization of faith in hu-
manity, and I argue that, in addition to having faith in humanity, a 
virtuous person has two other forms of faith in people, namely, a 
kind of faith in people to whom she bears certain personal rela-
tionships – for example, her spouse or her child – and a kind of 
faith in herself. Finally, in “Love, Scorn, and the Assertion of 
Black Humanity”, I draw on James Baldwin’s work in order to 
consider some of the vulnerabilities and ambiguities that are asso-
ciated with loving your fellow citizens, and having faith in their 
capacity for moral reform, when you live in an oppressive society.  
I said above that thinking carefully about the nature and value of 
these forms of faith illuminates aspects of moral life and aspects of 
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human flourishing that have been overlooked or poorly under-
stood in recent moral philosophy. But I also wish to highlight two 
other respects in which this project matters. First, having the 
forms of faith that I describe may sometimes prompt us to form 
beliefs that are, to some degree, epistemically irrational; in other 
words, a person’s faith may sometimes prompt her to violate 
norms that govern theoretical reasoning. So, I argue, accounting 
for the moral significance of these forms of faith, or accounting for 
their significance from a broader perspective of human flourish-
ing, helps us identify important limits on the role that epistemic 
rationality should play in our ideals of how to live. Second, exam-
ining these various forms of faith enables us to recognize certain 
limited, but important, respects in which, ideally, relations among 
members of the moral community mirror relations between 
friends, family members, or members of certain other kinds of 
personal relationships that we expect to find in a good human life. 
This recognition deepens our understanding of the nature and ap-
peal of the sort of moral community to which we should aspire.  
Turning now from faith to grief, imagine that someone recovers 
relatively quickly, say, within two or three months, from grief over 
the death of her spouse, whom she loved and who loved her; and 
suppose that, after some brief interval, she remarries. Does the 
fact that she feels better and gets on with her life relatively quickly 
somehow diminish the quality of her earlier relationship? Does it 
constitute a failure to do well by the person who died? In “Grief 
and Recovery”, which is co-authored with Erica Preston-
Roedder, we respond to two arguments that give affirmative an-
swers to these questions. The first, which is due to Dan Moller, 
states that recovering quickly from grief over the death of someone 
close to you is regrettable, in one respect, because it means that 
this person was relatively unimportant to you. The second argu-
ment, which derives from some classic literary discussions of grief, 
states that recovering from sadness, and getting on with your life, 
shortly after a loved one’s death is regrettable because it consti-
tutes a grave failure of solidarity, a way of abandoning the person 
who died. Responding to these arguments promises to mitigate 
certain anxieties about whether we do well by the people we love 
after they die. But beyond this, it helps us better understand what 
it means to be important to these people, and better understand 
how the attitudes that we adopt toward these people reinforce, or 
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undermine, our solidarity with them. In other words, the project 
promises to help us better understand how to cultivate good rela-
tionships with our loved ones during their lives.   
3.  
I will close by describing an additional project, as well as my plans 
for future research. In “Self-Deception and Kant’s Moral Phi-
losophy”, I describe some distinctive challenges that the phe-
nomenon of self-deception poses for Kant’s moral theory, and I 
argue that Kant’s theory has the resources to address these chal-
lenges. This paper is part of a larger project, which I pursue in the 
second strand of my research, of exploring the relation between 
norms that govern our theoretical reasoning – or in other words, 
our reasoning about what is true – and norms that govern our 
practical reasoning, or in other words, our reasoning about how to 
act.   
In future research, which will develop and extend the second 
strand of my research, I plan to address further topics concerning 
the nature and value of faith and related attitudes. In “Meaning 
and the Absurd in Tolstoy’s Confession”, I will draw on Tol-
stoy’s fiction, as well as his memoir of his spiritual crisis, in order 
to characterize a form of faith in one’s basic values; and I will ar-
gue that exhibiting this sort of faith is part of an appealing re-
sponse to the philosophical problem of life’s absurdity. In “The 
Religious Outlook”, I will pursue interests that I acquired as a 
result of developing a course on Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Kara-
mazov. Philosophers like John Dewey, and more recently, Thomas 
Nagel and Ronald Dworkin, have tried to identify a religious atti-
tude that we can adopt, and which contributes to our flourishing, 
whether or not we believe that anything like God exists. I want to 
explore some respects in which Dostoevsky’s fiction helps us iden-
tify such an attitude and appreciate its significance.  
